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CERTIFICATION OF UNFIT PILOTS: IS THE
UNITED STATES FLYING BLIND?
VICKI L. MINTER
I. INTRODUCTION
COULD THE UNITED STATES be liable for licensing
an unfit pilot? The surprising reality is, yes. The fol-
lowing case study will demonstrate how, under certain cir-
cumstances, the government can and has incurred liability
in its pilot certification process. The difficult part is deter-
mining when, in fact, the government can be held respon-
sible for its negligence in this area. At the heart of this
issue is the "discretionary function exception" of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA). This exception serves to
protect the government from liability in certain situations.
Because of the various interpretations of the exception by
different United States courts, the actual boundaries of
the discretionary function exception are unknown.
This Comment will trace Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the discretionary function exception, the applica-
tion of those interpretations in the circuit courts, and the
application of the exception in suits specifically involving
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The discus-
sion will also explore the difficulties in applying the dis-
cretionary function exception. The Comment will then
attempt to decipher the limits of the exception, in order
to predict when the government can be held liable for li-
censing a pilot who turns out to be unfit.
Due to the murky and confusing case law surrounding
the subject, any attempt to predict governmental liability
may be difficult. This confusion illustrates the need for a
763
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new, uniform standard for determining the applicability
of the discretionary function exception. A proposal for a
new, uniform standard will be the focus of part VI of this
Comment.
While there is no doubt that the government should be
liable for its negligence in the pilot certification process,
liability should be limited to those circumstances when
the negligent government conduct is outside the scope of
authorized conduct, or when the decision at issue does
not require the authorized decision-maker to balance pol-
icy objectives. Before addressing the primary substantive
issues, the historical background of governmental liabil-
ity, or the lack thereof, must be introduced.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The English maxim "the king can do no wrong" is the
basis for the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' The fed-
eral courts have adopted and applied the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity completely immunize the federal
government from suit.2 Applying sovereign immunity,
the government must first consent to suit before a case
against it can be initiated. Under the law at the turn of
the century, an injured person's sole remedy, regardless
of the degree of government fault, was to petition Con-
gress to introduce and pass a private claim bill, which
would grant the injured person relief.4 In 1907, the
Supreme Court justified the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,5 where Justice Holmes
Brian Blakeley, Comment, Discretion and the FAA: An Overview of the Applicability
of the Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act to FAA Activity, 49J.
AIR L. & COM. 143, 145 (1983) (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 970-71 (4th ed. 1971)).
2 Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, In the 1990's the Government Must be a
Reasonable Person in its Workplaces: The Discretionary Function Immunity Shield Must be
Trimmed, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359 (1989).
3 Blakeley, supra note 1, at 145.
4 Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 2, at 359.
. 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
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stated: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logi-
cal and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends."'6 The doctrine of sovereign immunity,
however, was at least partially displaced by the enactment
of the FTCA.7
B. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT8
The end of World War II brought a flood of private
claim bills, to which Congress responded by passing the
FTCA in 1946.9 The FTCA abolished total sovereign im-
munity, instead effecting a limited waiver of governmental
immunity.' 0 The act was created by Congress "with the
two-fold purpose of mitigating the harshness of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity and relieving itself of the bur-
den of dealing with the thousands of private claims bills
that were annually being submitted to Congress."" The
FTCA authorizes suits for the recovery of damages
against the United States for:
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission any
employee of the government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
Id. at 353.
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
1 Criticizing the effectiveness of the FTCA, Judge McKay stated in his
concurrence Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424-25 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988):
It undoubtedly will come as a surprise to many that two hundred
years after we threw out King George III, the rule that "the king can
do no wrong" still prevails at the federal level in all but the most
trivial matters.... [The FTCA] is largely a false promise in all but
"fender benders" and perhaps some cases involving medical
malpractice by government doctors.
Id.
9 Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 2, at 359-60.
0 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988).
'I Blakeley, supra note 1, at 146 (citing Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discretion-
aTy Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81, 81-82 (1968)).
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the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.' 2
This blanket waiver of immunity, however, is subject to
numerous exceptions.'I These exceptions clearly indicate
"that Congress exercised care to protect the Government
from claims, however negligently caused, that affected the
governmental functions."' 4 For example, the federal gov-
ernment is exempted from claims for punitive damages. ' 5
Moreover, the FTCA limits the amount of a contingent
fee the plaintiff's attorney may charge in such cases to
twenty-five percent in litigated cases and twenty percent
in settled cases. 16 Congress also made jury trials unavaila-
ble, 17 immunized the government from strict liability,"'
and completely excluded certain other claims."' One such
exclusion is the discretionary function exception, which
states that the waiver of immunity does not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution
of a statute or regulation, whether or not such regulation
be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.20
While the Act gives no reasons for excepting discretionary
acts from possible liability, the language implies "that the
purpose of the exception is to avoid subjecting the gov-
21 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988).
'4 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32 (1953).
' Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 2, at 360 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988)).
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988)).
17 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).
W Id. (citing Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972)).
Io d. Congress specifically excluded claims relating to governmental activities
(e.g. loss or miscarriage of postal matter, collection of taxes and customs duty,
detention of goods by law enforcement officers, fiscal operations of the Treasury)
and claims stemming from particular types of torts (e.g., assault, battery, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander). Id. at n.8 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680 (1988)).
21) 28 Blakeley, supra note 1, at 148 (citing Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 32).
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ernment to liability for acts of a 'governmental na-
ture.' "21 The meaning of "discretionary" is often
ambiguous, as demonstrated by the following case
discussion.
III. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION




1. Dalehite v. United States and Indian Towing Co. v.
United States
Dalehite v. United States,22 an early Supreme Court inter-
pretation of the discretionary function exception, in-
volved an action to recover damages caused by a large
explosion on two ships harbored at Texas City, Texas. As
a result of a post-World War II program to increase the
food supply in areas under military occupation, the ships
had been loaded with fertilizer to be distributed abroad.
The fertilizer was produced at government-owned facili-
ties and according to government specifications that re-
quired ammonium nitrate as the primary ingredient in the
fertilizer. An explosion occurred, after which hundreds of
plaintiffs sued the government, alleging that the United
States was negligent in its use of ammonium nitrate, a
chemical known to be explosive.
While the district court found that the government had
committed specific acts of negligence, the Supreme Court
held that the claim of negligence fell within the discretion-
ary function exception. 3 The Court declined to define
the exact parameters of the discretionary function shield,
but did offer some guidelines for determining what types
21 Id.
2 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
2. Id. at 43.
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of acts are protected by the exception. 4
The Court stated that the exception did not protect the
type of discretion necessarily exercised by judges, but
rather protected "the discretion of the executive or the
administrator to act according to one's judgment of the
best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in
American law."'25 The Court further recognized that the
function includes "more than the initiation of programs
and activities," extending also to "determinations made
by executives or administrators in establishing plans,
specifications or schedules of operations. '26 The Court
conceded that such discretion necessarily exists where
there is policy-based judgment, and that acts of subordi-
nates in effectuating government operations could not be
actionable. 27 Applying these standards, the Court held
that the actions of the government employees involved in
production of the fertilizer were protected because per-
formance was effectuated "under the direction of a plan
developed at a high level under a direct delegation of
plan-making authority from the apex of the Executive De-
partment .28 Thus, the allegedly negligent decisions were
made at a "planning level" rather than an "operational
level," thereby shielding such decisions from liability. 29
Unfortunately, this "planning-level/operations-level" dis-
tinction did not establish a bright-line test defining what
acts the discretionary function exception protected from
liability, leaving the lower courts to grapple with the is-
24 Id. at 35.
25 Id. at 34 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
26 Id. at 35-36.
27 Id. at 36.
' Id. at 40.
2 ) Id. at 42. This decision created the often used "planning/operational level"
distinction. Under this test, decisions that are made at a planning level are pro-
tected by the exception, whereas decisions made at an operational level are not.
Blakeley, supra note 1, at 153. A district court decision helped distinguish these
terms by stating that planning level decisions are those involving "the evaluation
of factors such as the financial, political, economic and social effects of a given
plan or policy." Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 220 (N.D. Cal.
1964). Conversely, operational level decisions are those encompassing "normal
day-by-day operations of the government. Id.
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sue.3 0  Shortly after Dalehite, however, the Court formu-
lated an alternative approach to determine the parameters
of the discretionary function exception.3
Three years after Dalehite, the Supreme Court decided
Indian Towing Co. v. United States,32 establishing the "Good
Samaritan" theory for determining the limits of the dis-
cretionary function exception. In Indian Towing a ship ran
aground because the Coast Guard allegedly failed to re-
pair a lighthouse and failed to alert plaintiffs that the
lighthouse was out of service. The Court rejected the ar-
gument that the United States should not be liable be-
cause the maintenance of the lighthouse was a
governmental function, finding untenable the govern-
mental/proprietary distinction for the purposes of deter-
mining "discretion. ' 33 The Court instead established the
"Good Samaritan" theory of governmental liability, hold-
ing that "while the Coast Guard had no duty to undertake
lighthouse service, once it exercised its discretion to do so
it was under an obligation to use due care in its opera-
tions."34 In reaching this decision, the Court relied on
-0 Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 2, at 363. Thirty-three years after Dalehite,
the Supreme Court was still experimenting with the "planning-level/operations-
level" distinction in United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
31 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
32 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
3 Id. at 68, Municipal corporations have governmental and proprietary (non-
governmental) functions. Id. at 65. Under a number of state tort claims acts, the
governmental functions of municipal governments are automatically considered
"discretionary" for the purposes of the tort claims act. Id. The Court in Indian
Towing refused to draw such a distinction. Id. In rejecting this distinction, the
Court noted that all government activity is inescapably uniquely governmental,
quoting an earlier Supreme Court decision for this proposition: "Government is
not partly public or partly private, depending upon the governmental pedigree of
the type of a particular activity or the manner in which the Government conducts
it." Id. at 67-68 (quoting Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383-84
(1947)).
4 Blakeley, supra note 1, at 151 (citing Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 65).
The Court affirmed the Indian Towing approach in the 1957 case of Rayonier,
Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957), which involved a claim for damages
allegedly caused by the negligence of federal employees who allowed a forest fire
to start and failed to use due care to put the fire out. Id. at 319. The plaintiffs
specifically alleged that the employees allowed highly flammable, dry grass and
brush to accumulate near a railroad track, where sparks from a train ignited fires
on the adjoining land. Id. at 317. The Court rejected the lower court's reliance
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"hornbook tort law" for the proposition that after some-
one has undertaken to warn the public of danger, induc-
ing reliance, that person must conduct his or her "good
samaritan" behavior in a careful manner.3 5
Today, however, a plaintiff in a negligent certification
case may argue that Indian Towing stands for the proposi-
tion that the discretionary function exception does not
cover situations where the "government undertakes an ac-
tivity which induces reliance, '3 6 and that the pilot certifi-
cation process is just such an activity. This approach
implies that the discretionary function exception may not
immunize the certification process for pilots from liability
if the plaintiff can prove that the government was not obli-
gated to conduct the certification process, but rather un-
dertook the responsibility, inducing reliance by the
public. Such an argument would likely fail, however, be-
cause the government could probably prove that con-
ducting the pilot certification process is a governmental
obligation rather than a voluntarily assumed duty.
2. Application of the Early Interpretations by the Circuit
Courts
The circuit courts took a variety of approaches in apply-
ing the tests enunciated in Dalehite and Indian Towing. In
Smith v. United States3 7 the Fifth Circuit criticized the
Dalehite "planning-level/operations-level test for resting
on Dalehite that the discretionary function exception covered employees acting as
public firemen. Id. at 317-18. As in Indian Towing, the Court refused to recognize
the "uniquely governmental" function (of public firemen) as a basis for immunity
from liability. Id. at 318-19. Instead, the Court remanded the decision to deter-
mine whether a private person would be responsible for similar negligence under
the laws of the State where the acts occurred. Id. at 321.
35 Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64-65.
36 Blakeley, supra note 1, at 153.
s7 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. dmnied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967). In Smith the plaintiff
alleged that the government's failure to arrest or prosecute certain persons re-
sulted in injury to the plaintiffis business. Plaintiff Smith served on a jury in a civil
rights damages case where the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Smith
alleged that his participation in the jury verdict caused certain civil rights groups
to picket his grocery business. Smith claimed that the FBI's refusal to sufficiently
investigate and prosecute the boycotters resulted in injury to his business.
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on a distinction so finespun and capricious as to be almost
incapable of being held in the mind for adequate formula-
tion."'3 8 In addition to applying this test, the lower courts
had to somehow apply the decision in Indian Towing, and
determine how that decision affected the planning-level/
operations-level test. 9 Some courts decided to use the
Indian Towing "Good Samaritan" test only after determin-
ing that the activity could be characterized as operational,
and therefore, outside of the scope of the discretionary
function exception.4 °
In the Third Circuit case of Griffin v. United States,4' the
plaintiffs sued the government to recover damages for in-
juries sustained as a result of ingesting an oral, live-virus
vaccine. Plaintiffs claimed that the Division of Biologic
Standards (DBS) failed to comply with established gov-
ernmental standards by approving a particular lot of vac-
cine to be used on the public. 2 The Griffin court applied
s8 Id. at 246 (quoting Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 68). The Fifth Circuit in this
case held that the discretionary function exception was applicable to exempt the
government from liability for exercising the discretion inherent in the
prosecutorial function of Attorney General in his refusal to bring suit. Id. at 248.
-' Blakeley, supra note 1, at 154.
40 Id. (citing Medley v. United States, 543 F. Supp. 1211, 1221-22 (N.D. Cal.
1982)). Medley involved an allegation that the FAA negligently plotted a danger-
ous route over the Sierra Nevada mountains on its aeronautical chart. The court
found that the choice of the particular route selected was an operational-level de-
cision, and, relying on Indian Towing, found that the FAA had a duty to use due
care once it undertook this act. Medley, 543 F. Supp. at 1222.
41 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
42 Id. at 1064. In an attempt to precisely explain the challenge on appeal, the
court noted that the plaintiffs
did not challenge the Surgeon General's determination to approve a
live-virus immunization program. Neither did plaintiffs challenge
the regulations which established the standard against which all
manufactured lots were to be measured. These were matters involv-
ing balancing of policy considerations in advancing the public inter-
est. Plaintiffs, in the instant case, challenge solely the manner by
which the regulation was implemented.
Id. In reference to the standards the government allegedly violated, the court
stated:
The regulation enumerates five criteria as evidence of
neurovirulence: the number of animals showing lesions characteris-
tic of poliovirus infection, the number of animals showing lesions
other than those characteristic of poliovirus infection, the severity of
the lesions, the degree of dissemination of the lesions, and the rate
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Dalehite to determine that the type of judgment involved
was not at the policy-making level, but instead required
only scientific determination.4 3 In conclusion, the court
held that the United States may be liable where govern-
mental employees simply fail to comply with statutory and
regulatory requirements.4 4
Scientists, of course, must use their own judgment in
balancing the necessary criteria in order to determine
whether the vaccine lots met the required standards. The
court, however, determined that this type of judgment
''was not that of a policy-maker promulgating regulations
by balancing competing policy considerations in deter-
mining the public interest," but rather a scientific deter-
mination, where government scientists were required to
comply with necessary statutory and regulatory require-
ments in making their determinations.4 5
Had the Third Circuit been faced with a claim that the
United States negligently licensed an unfit pilot, the court
most likely would have analyzed the type of judgment
used in the FAA certification process to determine if the
decision to certify required "balancing competing policy
considerations in determining the public interest, '46 or
whether the type of judgment involved following specific
statutory and regulatory requirements. If the latter is the
case, the court would then decide whether the govern-
ment employees followed these requirements. If the
court found that the statutory and regulatory require-
ments were violated, the United States would not be pro-
tected by the discretionary function exception. Thus,
while the certification process does depend on the discre-
of occurrence of paralysis not attributable to the mechanical injury
resulting from inoculation trauma.
Id. at 1065. The court ruled that the scientists were to take these five criteria and
to make a comparative analysis, in order to decide whether the neurovirulence of
each lot exceeded the reference standard. Id. at 1068.
4I Id. at 1066.
4 Id. at 1069.
4.5 Id. at 1066.
4,i Griffin, 500 F.2d at 1066.
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tion of government employees, "[t]he violation of a non-
discretionary command takes what otherwise might be
characterized as a 'discretionary function' outside the
scope of the statutory exception. 47
The Ninth Circuit applied a "planning-level/opera-
tions-level" test in Grunnet v. United States,48 but relied on
its own previous cases to determine the scope of the dis-
cretionary function exception. In Grunnet the plaintiff
filed a wrongful death case against the United States. The
plaintiff alleged that her daughter died in Jonestown,
Guyana, as a member of the People's Temple, due to the
government's negligent acts. Grunnet essentially claimed
that the government acted negligently in not properly
warning her daughter about the dangers of the People's
Temple and in withholding important information about
the Temple, all of which allegedly led to the violent
deaths of the Temple's members.49
The court stated that "[t]he prevailing test in the Ninth
Circuit for determining whether an act or omission is dis-
cretionary for purposes of the exemption is whether it oc-
curred on the 'planning level' of governmental activity or
on the 'operational' level. ' 5 °  Furthermore, the court
47 Id. at 1068-69. The court held: "We do not hold that the Government may
be liable for policy determinations made by its officials. Rather, we hold only that
the Government may be liable where its employees, in carrying out their duties,
fail to conform to pre-existing statutory and regulatory requirements." Id. at
1069.
48 730 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1984).
49 Id. at 574. Grunnet alleged four specific acts of negligence by the
government:
(1) failure to warn Patricia of the danger the People's Temple posed
to her; (2) failure to provide Congressman Ryan with all of the infor-
mation on the People's Temple possessed by the executive branch of
the government that would determine whether his visit [to Guyana]
"would cause or provoke violent reactions causing the deaths of the
members of People's Temple in Jonestown, Guyana;" (3) undertak-
ing investigations into the People's Temple when the government
knew that such investigations might displease the leaders and fur-
ther endanger the lives of the members of the Temple; and (4) fail-
ure to warn Grunnet or Patricia's other relatives of the danger which
the'People's Temple posed to Patricia.
Id.
Id. at 575 (citing Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir. 1983)).
1994] 773
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"also consider[s] 'the ability of the judiciary to evaluate
the act or omission and whether judicial evaluation would
impair the effective administration of the government.' "51
Based on these principles, the court held that the alleged
negligent acts involved decisions made at a planning level
rather than an operational level, and that the decisions in-
volved fell "squarely within the discretionary function
exception. ,52
B. A GIANT STEP FOR THE GOVERNMENT
1. United States v. Varig Airlines
Amid the interpretive turmoil in the circuit courts and
nearly thirty years after Indian Towing, the Supreme Court
reexamined its earlier interpretations of the discretionary
function exception in United States v. Varig Airlines.53 Varig
Airlines involved a claim for damages against the FAA for
alleged negligent certification of an airplane. Plaintiffs
claimed that the Civil Aeronautics Agency 54 negligently
inspected and certified a Boeing 707 aircraft. 55 In decid-
ing this case, the Court distinguished Indian Towing on the
grounds that, unlike Indian Towing, this case involved op-
51 Id. (quoting Nevin v. United States, 696 F.2d 1229, 1230 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983)).
-12 Id. Regarding the claim that the government failed to adequately warn Con-
gressman Ryan, the court stated:
Generally, the State Department's decision to share an internal in-
vestigation with a member of Congress is a matter of Executive privi-
lege. While there may be some exceptions to the general rule that
the Executive branch has no affirmative obligation to disclose inter-
nal matters .... [citations omitted] the fact that a proposed foreign
visit by a member of the legislative branch may somehow result in
danger to third parties in the foreign land does not trigger any such
exception. Because there is no allegation here that the State Depart-
ment withheld information regarding possible peril to Congressman
Ryan himself resulting from his proposed visit to Guyana, we do not
decide if there is an affirmative duty on the part of the government
to warn a Congressman of imminent danger to himself of which it
has advance notice.
Id. at 576-76.
- 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
." The Civil Aeronautics Agency was the predecessor to the Federal Aviation
Administration.
,15 The Boeing 707 was owned by S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio
[59
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erational-level activity.56 The Court then adhered to its
earlier decision in Dalehite, utilizing the planning-level/op-
erations-level distinction.
While the Court conceded that it is impossible to pre-
cisely define the scope of the discretionary function ex-
ception, the Court mentioned two factors to use in
determining whether or not governmental decisions are
protected from liability. 58 The Court first noted that it is
the "nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
actor, that governs whether the discretionary function ex-
ception applies in a given case."' 59 The Court then quoted
Dalehite for the proposition that the discretionary function
exception applies to individual employees exercising dis-
cretion and not just governmental agencies.6 °
Hence, the Court set forth a basic two-part inquiry for
determining the application of the exception:
[First,] whether the challenged acts of a Government
employee-whatever his or her rank-are of the nature
and quality that Congress intended to shield form tort
liability.
Second, whatever else the discretionary function excep-
tion may include, it plainly was intended to encompass the
discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a
regulator of the conduct of private individuals. 6'
The Court suggested that an underlying basis for creat-
ing a discretionary function exception to the Act was that
"Congress wished to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of
Grandense ("Varig Airlines") and was in flight when a fire broke out in one of the
lavatories. A majority of the plane's passengers died as a result of the fire.
Varig Airlines, although based on the discretionary function exception, is perhaps
more applicable to the discussion of negligent pilot certification since it involves
the similar issue of negligent airplane certification. Varig Airlines is most useful,
however, for discussing the historical application of the exception, in light of the
more recent decision, Berkovitz v. United States, discussed in Part Ill(C).
51 Varig, 467 U.S. at 812 (as opposed to "planning level" activity).
.1 Id. at 813.
.58 Id.
59 Id.
Id. (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 33 (1953)).
Varig, 467 U.S. at 813-14.
7751994]
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legislative and administrative decisions grounded in so-
cial, economic, and political policy through the medium of
an action in tort. ' 62 The Court determined that Con-
gress, by protecting the government from liability, en-
acted the exception in order to avoid hindering efficient
government operations.6 3 Based on these considerations,
the Supreme Court held that the action was barred by the
discretionary function exception because the FAA's deter-
mination of a private individual's safety was a discretion-
ary function.6 4
Varig has been construed by the government to stand
for the proposition that regulatory activities are immune
from tort liability under the exception.65 In contrast, the
plaintiffs bar has argued that the discretionary function
exception should not apply to decisions of federal em-
ployees "not grounded in social, economic and political
policy."' 66 Had Congress truly intended to exempt all reg-
ulatory decisions and activities from liability, it could have
specifically done so in the FTCA.67 The broad language
used by the Court in Varig, however, has remained a
touchstone for those favoring protection of all regulatory
activities.
2. Application of Varig by the Circuit Courts
The Varig decision failed to clarify the parameters of
governmental immunity, and the conflict among the cir-
cuits continued. 6 The government argued that Varig im-
munized all regulatory activities of regulatory agencies.69
Plaintiffs, however, argued that the discretionary function
exception only protected decisions of government em-
112 Id. at 814.
63 Id.
1"4 Id. at 819-20.
65 Thomas H. Rice, Berkovitz v. United States: Has a Phoenix Arisen from the Ashes
of Varig?, 54J. AIR L. & CoM. 757, 774 (1989).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 771.
{" Id. at 774.
Id.
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ployees based on social, economic, and political
grounds.70 This conflict eventually warranted a review of
the Varig decision in Berkovitz v. United States.7 ' In the
years between Varig and Berkovitz, however, the courts
grappled with the application of the exception.
As the broad implications of the Varig decision became
apparent, the Third Circuit, which had hesitantly applied
the discretionary function exception in Griffin, embraced
the principles established in Vanig.72 For example, in the
1986 decision of Merklin v. United States,73 the court sum-
marily applied the Varig principles to find the action there
barred by the discretionary function exception. 4 In
Merklin a former foreman of a radioactive ore processing
plant sued the United States for compensation for injuries
sustained while working near radioactive materials.75
Merklin claimed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
which employed the ore plant, failed to properly inspect
the plant, breaching its alleged duty to ensure that work-
ing conditions at the facility were not unreasonably
dangerous.76
The court relied on two guidelines established in Varig
to determine whether the discretionary function barred
Merklin's claim. "First, we must ascertain whether 'the
challenged acts of a government employee-whatever his
or her rank-are of the nature and quality that Congress
intended to shield from tort liability.' ,,77 Second, the
Merklin court observed that the discretionary function ex-
ception plainly applies to "the discretionary acts of the
Government acting in its role as a regulator of the con-
70 Id.
71 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (discussed in Part III(C)).
72 See discussion supra, Part III(A)(2).
73 788 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1986).
74 Id. at 175.
15 Merklin was diagnosed as having cancer of the larynx, throat, and lymph
nodes of the neck, which allegedly resulted from his contact with radioactive
substances.
7, Merklin, 788 F.2d at 173.
77 Id. at 174 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984)).
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duct of individuals. ' 78 In reference to the first guideline,
the court determined that Congress intended the excep-
tion to protect agency decisions involving policy judg-
ment from liability. 79 In support of this proposition, the
court noted that the Atomic Energy Act granted the AEC
substantial discretion in enforcing the Act's provisions.8"
The court held that the discretionary function exception
barred the claim because Merklin's theory would "hold
the AEC liable in its capacity as a regulator." '
Three years after the Supreme Court's holding in Varig,
the Ninth Circuit faced the problem of deciding whether
the government could be liable for negligent distribution
of polio vaccine. In Baker v. United States8 2 the plaintiff
contracted poliomyelitis after his nephew was inoculated
with trivalent, a live, oral poliovirus vaccine. 8 3 The plain-
tiff alleged that the poliomyelitis was caused by the negli-
gence of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) in failing to require mandatory tests prior
to issuing a license to the laboratory to manufacture the
84vaccine.
78 Id.
71, Id. (citing yarig, 467 U.S. at 814).
-o Id. The court cited 42 U.S.C. § 2035(c) (1988), which created an inspection
division "to gather information" to determine if plants are complying with the
Atomic Energy Act. Id.
"I Merklin, 788 F.2d at 174. The court stated: "When an agency determines the
extent to which it will supervise the safety procedures of private individuals, it is
exercising discretionary regulatory authority of the most basic kind." Id. (quoting
Varig, 467 U.S. at 819-20). The court distinguished an Eighth Circuit case, McMi-
chael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985), on the ground that the deci-
sions in McMichael did not involve policy judgment, but rather precise, technical
applications. Merklin, 788 F.2d at 175. The McMichael case at least seemed factu-
ally similar, as it was based on allegedly negligent inspection by the Defense De-
partment of a munitions plant. The Merhlin court stated: "We believe that
McMichael must be read narrowly to apply only to those situations where no policy
judgment is implicated. We find the instant case differs distinctly from McMichael
in that the AEC's discretion in conducting plant inspections appears unbounded."
Id.
82 817 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988).
"- The plaintiff, Baker, was permanently injured as a result of the exposure.
4 Baker, 817 F.2d at 561-62.
The Vaccine is composed of all three Sabin strains of live poliovirus
corresponding to the three different types of polio and therefore
called "trivalent." A characteristic of live Sabin polio vaccine is that
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In determining whether this claim was barred by the
discretionary function exception, the Baker court focused
on whether Congress intended to protect the government
from liability for failing to follow its own regulations. s5
The court attempted to use the guidelines set forth in
Varig in making its determination, but noted that Varig,
Dalehite, and numerous Ninth Circuit cases did not ad-
dress the specific issue in Baker.86 The court turned to an
Eighth Circuit case, Loge v. United States,87 which is factu-
ally similar, but which was decided before Varig. The Loge
court relied on Griffin v. United States88 for its holding that
the government's negligent failure to require tests pursu-
ant to 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(b) was not protected from lia-
bility under the discretionary function exception.89 The
government, of course, maintained that Varig undercut
Loge and Griffin, in that the discretionary function excep-
tion barred claims based on regulatory inspection and en-
forcement activities. 90 The court, however, declined to
hold that the exception arbitrarily barred such claims and
held that the FTCA does not bar a claim based on a gov-
not only is the vaccine's recipient immunized from polio, but unim-
munized persons who come into close contact with the vaccinated
person also may be immunized through a "shed virus" that spreads
from the person vaccinated to the person in close contact. Because
Sabin strains contain the live polio virus, either or both persons
could develop polio. Consequently, the Secretary has promulgated
regulations pertaining to safety, purity, and potency standards that
serve to protect susceptible persons from contracting the disease.
Id. at 561; see 21 C.F.R. §§ 630.10-.19 (1983).
,. Baker, 817 F.2d at 563.
86 Id. at 564. The precise issue was "whether a government agency, when regu-
lating the conduct of private individuals, may be subject to tort liability for the
alleged negligence of an agency employee in failing to follow a specific mandatory
regulation." Id. The court noted that the failure was "contrary to the applicable
statute, to license a vaccine that had not been tested by its manufacturer in exactly
the manner required by the HEW's own regulations." Id.
87 662 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982). Plaintiff con-
tracted polio after her son was inoculated with a polioviral vaccine, and as a result
of contracting the disease, became paraplegic. Plaintiff sued the United States
and unknown employees of HEW claiming the government was negligent in regu-
lating, testing, and licensing the vaccine.
" See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
89 Loge, 662 F.2d at 1272-73.
Baker, 817 F.2d at 565.
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ernmental employee's failure to obey mandatory regula-
tory commands. 91
C. A FURTHER ATrEMPT AT CLARIFICATION
1. Berkovitz v. United States
Some of the confusion was cleared up four years after
Varig, in Berkovitz v. United States.92 This case was one of
several involving an individual contracting polio from a
live polio vaccine. The Supreme Court unanimously held
that the discretionary function exception covered only
governmental decisions involving the permissible exercise
of policy judgment. 93 The Court held firm to its position
that conduct could not be considered discretionary unless
it involved an element of choice.94 Furthermore, the
Court stated that merely because judgment must be used
does not necessarily mean that the conduct would be con-
sidered discretionary. 95 The Court held that in deciding
such cases, it must first be determined whether the judg-
ment involved was the kind Congress intended to immu-
nize from liability.96 The kinds of decisions Congress
apparently intended to protect were those administrative
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political pol-
icy, and therefore, the exception protects "only govern-
mental actions and decisions based on considerations of
public policy. ' 97
The Court noted its two previous decisions holding that
not all regulatory activities were immune.98 And, in order
to clearly reject the government's "blanket immunity"
91 Id. at 566.
112 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
93 Id. at 539. "Just as the Court used the decision of Indian Towing to retreat
from the broad holding of Dalehite, it now used Berkovitz, a mere four years after
Varig, to retreat from the broad holding of Varig and the position the government
espoused from that holding." Rice, supra note 65, at 781.
' Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
I d.
*" Id.
97 Id. at 537.
" See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957); Indian Towing, 350
U.S. 61 (1955); supra notes 32-34.
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claim, the Court stated: "To the extent we have not al-
ready put the Government's argument to rest, we do so
now. The discretionary function exception applies only to
conduct that involves the permissible exercise of policy
judgment."99
The Court then reviewed the relevant statutory and
regulatory provisions and held that the agency must col-
lect all the required material from manufacturers and ex-
amine this data as well as the product to see if the product
meets safety standards before issuing a product license. 00
The Court held that the discretionary function exception
does not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or pol-
icy specifically prescribes a course of action for an em-
ployee to follow.' 0 The Court ruled that the agency had
no discretion to go against mandated statutory and regu-
latory procedures'0 2 and that the Berkovitzs' claims sur-
vived the government's, motion to dismiss.'0 3 The
Berkovitz case makes two assertions regarding Varig:
"One, that Varig is still good law; and two, it was never
meant to immunize governmental conduct to the extent
' Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 539.
I Id. at 542.
to, Id. at 544.
The DBS has no discretion to issue a license without first receiving
the required test data; to do so would violate a specific statutory and
regulatory directive. Accordingly, to the extent that petitioners' li-
censing claim is based on a decision of the DBS to issue a license
without having received the required test data, the discretionary
function exception imposes no bar.
Id. at 542-43.
102 Id. at 542.
103 Id. at 548. Because the Court was reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court
accepted all the allegations in the Berkovitzs' complaint as true. The Court
stated:
Petitioners, of course, have not proved their factual allegations, but
they are not required to do so on a motion to dismiss. If those alle-
gations are correct ... the discretionary function exception does not
bar the claim. Because petitioners may yet show, on the basis of
materials obtained in discovery or otherwise, that the conduct chal-
lenged here did not involve the permissible exercise of policy discre-
tion, the invocation of the discretionary function exception to
dismiss petitioners' lot release claim was improper.
Id. at 547-48.
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that the government asserted after Varig."'' 4
2. Application of Berkovitz by the Circuit Courts
In the 1989 case of Kennewick Irrigation District v. United
StateS'0 5 the Ninth Circuit applied the slightly less confus-
ing principles of Berkovitz. Kennewick involved an action by
the district and others to recover for property damage and
personal injuries arising out of breaks in the district's
main irrigation canal, which was designed and con-
structed by the federal government. The court applied
the two-step test established by Berkovitz for determining
whether the discretionary function exception applies. 0 6
First, was the action a matter of choice for the em-
ployee?'017 The Ninth Circuit noted that the exception
was not applicable when a specific course of action for the
employee to follow is prescribed by federal statute, regu-
lation or policy.' 0 8 Second, if the conduct is deemed to
involve judgment, is the discretionary function exception
designed to shield that type of judgment? 0 9 To be pro-
tected, the judgment must be " 'grounded in social, eco-
nomic, and political policy.' "110
In applying the Berkovitz principles and barring the
claim against the government for negligent design, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the government's decisions
in designing the canal involved judgment regarding the
balancing of many technical, economic, and social consid-
erations. I' The decisions of the government, however, in
constructing the canal were not based on public policy,
but instead were based on "technical, scientific engineer-
104 See Rice, supra note 65, at 788.
, 880 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1989).
Im Id. at 1025.
107 Id.
"I" Id. More specifically, discretion may be removed where the government in-
corporated specific safety standards into the contract, imposing certain duties on
the government's agent. Id. at 1026.
i' ld. at 1025.
Id. (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814).
I" Id. at 1033.
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ing considerations." '"i 2 Therefore, the exception did not
bar plaintiff's claim based on the negligent construction of
the canal.' 13
Recently, in Routh v. United States" 4 the Ninth Circuit
further clarified application of the discretionary function
exception. The court used Kennewick as its main authority
stating that Kennewick contained the most extensive dis-
cussion of the discretionary function exception based on
the underlying decisions of the Supreme Court." 5
In Routh the United States Forest Services had awarded
a private company a contract to clear a road in Alaska.
The plaintiff, an employee of the company, was injured
when trees he was maneuvering fell onto his backhoeing
machine. In his complaint against the government, plain-
tiff Routh claimed that the backhoe had no falling object
protection system and that the United States's contracting
officers were aware of the deficiency and failed to notify
the contractor of the deficiency. The Ninth Circuit held
that the officers' failure to require the contractor to pro-
vide the safety equipment was not a discretionary function
shielded from tort liability. 16
In deciding whether the officers' actions were shielded
112 Id. at 1031.
-, Id. at 1032. The Ninth Circuit made a similar distinction in Summers v.
United States, 905 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1990). In Summers the plaintiff, four and
one-half-year-old Kendra Summers, sustained injuries at Rodeo Beach when she
stepped on the hot embers of a fire ring at the beach. For some time prior to
plaintiff's injury, fires were permitted at any location on Rodeo Beach.
At the time of Kendra's injuries, however, the Park Service had changed its pol-
icy to confine fires to three specific fire rings located on the beach. Despite the
change in policies visitors continued to build fires outside of the designated rings.
Applying the guidelines of Berkovitz, the court held that the National Park Ser-
vice's failure to warn visitors about the danger of hot coals on Rodeo Beach re-
sembled more of a "departure from the safety considerations established in the
Service['s] . . . policies than a mistaken judgment in a matter clearly involving
choices among political, economic, and social factors." Id. at 1215. Thus, the
Service's failure to recognize and act upon the danger was not protected under
the discretionary function exception. Id. at 1217.
14 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1991).
1,5 Id. at 854 n.2. The court noted that Kennewick was based on the underlying
Supreme Court decisions of Dalehite v. United States, United States v. Varig Air-
lines, and Berkovitz v. United States. Id.
-; Id. at 857.
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under the discretionary function exception, the court
again used the two-step analysis established in Ken-
newick.' 7 First, the court had to determine whether the
conduct was discretionary, i.e., whether the action taken
was a matter of choice for the officers.'" The court speci-
fied that an action will not be considered discretionary if a
"federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action for an employee to fol-
low."" 9 If the court concludes that the challenged con-
duct involved discretionary judgment, the court must then
determine whether the discretionary action is "of the kind
that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield,"120 i.e., whether the judgment is "grounded in so-
cial, economic and political policy.' 1 2' These two steps
can be consolidated into two simple questions: 1) Was
the conduct discretionary? 2) Was the decision a policy
decision? 22
Although the contract itself required the contracting of-
ficers to notify the contractor of any noncompliance with
safety regulations, the court determined that discretion
was nonetheless involved. 23 The discretion existed in the
officers' determination of whether the falling object pro-
tection system was a necessary safety provision. 24 After
determining that the officers' actions involved discretion,
the court applied the second consideration- whether the
judgment was grounded in social, economic, and political
policy. 25 The government argued that the officers' deci-
sions were policy-related, claiming that in making such a
decision an officer "must balance the policy objectives of
promoting work place safety against practical considera-
tions, most notably, the disruptive impact that a stop-work




121 Id. (quoting Kennewick, 880 F.2d at 1025).
1' Routh, 941 F.2d at 855-56.
12-1 Id. at 855.
124 Id.
1'2. Id. at 856.
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order would have on government operations."' 12 6 The
court rejected this argument, holding that the officers' de-
cision was not policy-based. 127
The court analogized the type of decision-making in-
volved in Routh to the type of decision-making in Ken-
newick, which was not protected by the exception. In
Kennewick, the court determined that the discretionary
function exception protected the decisions concerning the
design of the canal, but not the decisions involving the con-
struction of the canal.' 2  The court recognized that the
contracting officer must use discretion during construc-
tion, but that the discretion used was based on "technical,
scientific, or engineering considerations,"' 129 not policy
considerations. 3 0 The court noted that "virtually all gov-
ernment actions affect costs since the action itself requires
resources,"' 3'' but the court held that the decisions were
not shielded from liability "because they were not based
on public policy.' 3 2 Likewise, the court in Routh held
that the decision of the contracting officer-whether a sit-
uation created a violation of the safety provisions of the
contract-was not based on public policy.' 33
In reaching this decision, the Routh court distinguished
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Tracor/MBA, Inc. v. United
126 Id.
127 Id. at 857.
128 Routh, 941 F.2d at 856 (citing Kennewick, 880 F.2d at 1031).




-' Routh, 941 F.2d at 857. The court's rationale was based on the presumption
that the contractor had a fixed price contract and a fixed completion date, and
therefore, any implementation of safety measures would be a cost to the contrac-
tor, not to the United States. Id. The court was also not persuaded that the delay
that might be caused by a stop-work order (until compliance) would be much of
an economic concern to the United States. Id. at 856. In a footnote, the court
noted that the government's argument raised serious concerns, namely that the
contracting officer would be "engaging in a cost-benefit analysis, quantifying, by a
dollar amount, the cost of risk to human life or limb when deciding whether to
issue stop-work orders." Id. at 857 n.3.
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States. 134 In Tracor/MBA government inspectors were re-
quired to ensure that manufacturers of explosives com-
plied with safety requirements. The inspectors had a
review checklist for procedure compliance.' 35  Tracor
claimed that the inspections were conducted negligently.
The court held that the decisions of the inspectors were
protected by the discretionary function exception because
the decisions fell within the discretion contemplated by
the regulations. 136 The Routh court emphasized that the
safety manual in Tracor "took into account necessary pub-
lic policy trade-offs among cost of manufacture, difficul-
ties in maintenance, risk to handlers, reliability of function
and other factors relevant to the manufacture of military
weapons and defensive systems."'' 3 7 But as to the con-
tracting officer's decision in Routh, the court stated: "No
comparable regulations have been shown to exist here
from which we can conclude that the government agents'
conduct was within the ambit of the political, social and
economic considerations embodied in the regulations."13 8
This discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretations
1.4 933 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1991). The United States adopted regulations re-
quiring manufactures of explosives to comply with specific safety standards.
135 The government had a "forty-seven step procedures review checklist for
safety compliance." Id. at 665.
1s1 Id. at 667. The court found that the inspectors' decisions when checking
ventilation and flame-retardancy of clothing were within the discretion contem-
plated by the checklist. Id. The court stated:
[AIli of the points on the checklist upon which Tracor relies merely
state a very general course of conduct for the inspectors to follow.
For example, the checklist tells the inspector to check the ventilation
every 30 days. Tracor does not argue that the inspectors failed to
check the ventilation. Instead, Tracor contends that the inspectors
performed an inadequate inspection of the ventilation. The check-
list, however, prescribed no procedures for testing the ventilation
and did not specify what action an inspector should take if he found
inadequate ventilation. Likewise, the checklist did not specifically
tell the inspector how to check the flame-retardancy of clothing.
The method of ensuring the flame-retardancy of the clothing, like
testing the ventilation, was left to the inspector's choice. Accord-
ingly, the inspector's conduct was discretionary and protected by the
discretionary function exception.Id.
d1.7 Routh, 941 F.2d at 857.
'.48 Id.
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and the various courts of appeals' applications of the dis-
cretionary function exception laid the foundation for ap-
plying the exception to future cases. In order to properly
decide whether the United States could or should be lia-
ble for licensing unfit pilots, however, it is necessary to
review specific cases involving suits against the FAA.139
IV. APPLICATION OF THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION IN SUITS
AGAINST THE FAA
Very few cases have actually addressed the issue of
whether the United States should be liable for negligent
certification of pilots. Furthermore, the few cases which
do involve this specific issue have produced varying re-
sults. Numerous suits against the FAA in general, how-
ever, involved application of the discretionary function
exception. These cases, in addition to the few cases spe-
cifically addressing the issue of negligent certification, are
helpful in deciphering the boundaries of the exception.
Swanson v. United States °4 0 is a helpful early interpreta-
tion of the application of the discretionary function excep-
tion to an aviation case. Plaintiffs sued the United States
to recover damages for the wrongful death of their hus-
band and father. The decedent worked as a technical rep-
resentative of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation at a
139 14 C.F.R. 61, 67 (1993) (containing the actual regulations for pilot certifica-
tion). The Federal Aviation Act provides:
Any person may file with the Secretary of Transportation an applica-
tion for an airman certificate. If the Secretary of Transportation
finds, after investigation, that such person possesses proper qualifi-
cations for, and is physically able to perform the duties pertaining
to, the position for which the airman certificate is sought, he shall
issue such certificate, containing such terms, conditions, and limita-
tions as to duration thereof, periodic or special examinations, tests
of physical fitness, and other matters as the Secretary of Transporta-
tion may determine to be necessary to assure safety in air commerce.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1422(b)(1) (1988).
A pilot is required to obtain a medical certificate as a condition to
receiving an airman's certificate, which certifies a pilot's aviation
skills. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(c) (1993); 14 C.F.R. Part 67 (1993).
140 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
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California Air Force base. While participating in a test
flight, the decedent was involved in a fatal plane crash.
The test flight was the final step of a Material Improve-
ment Project, conducted by Military Air Transport Service
to develop a fail-safe system for the plane's elevator
mechanism. ' 4
In determining whether the discretionary function ex-
ception barred the plaintiffs' claim, the court noted that
the negligence related to either the design or installation
method of the modification. 42 The plaintiffs did not ar-
gue that the decision to develop the fail-safe modification
was a negligent act. Because of its reliance on the Dalehite
planning-level/operations-level theory the court noted
the lack of this argument. 43 The court recognized that
''every action of a government employee ... involves the
use of some degree of discretion,"'' 44 yet the discretionary
function exception applies only when the plaintiff "claims
that conduct at the planning level is the cause of his inju-
ries. '"" 4 5 The exception does not apply to conduct at the
operations level even if that conduct was necessary to
carry out a planning-level decision. 146 Decisions made at
the planning level are those involving questions of policy,
requiring the decision-maker to balance financial, polit-
ical, economic, and social factors. 14 7 Conversely, deci-
sions made at the operations level involve the ordinary
daily operations of the government, and even though
these decisions require the use of discretion, they typically
do not require the decision-maker to balance policy
,41 "The elevator mechanism is functionally similar to the rudder, except that
instead of being used to change the direction of the plane, it is used to change
altitude.... The modification was an attempt to provide a 'fail-safe' system in case
the normal system failed." Id. at 218-19. The modification was for emergency
purposes, in the event that the normal system failed. Id.
142 Id. at 220.
'43 Id. at 219. The court noted that although parts of Dalehile were no longer
controlling due to the Rayonier decision, several circuit courts had adopted the
planning-level/operations-level distinction. Id.
14 Id. at 219-20.






The court concluded that the decision to develop a
modification was a planning-level decision, but the design
or installation of the modification was operations-level
conduct, even though the conduct was necessary for car-
rying out the planning-level decision.' 49 The discretion-
ary function exception, therefore, did not bar this
claim. 150
The 1982 Ninth Circuit decision in Medley v. United
States' 5' illustrates the types of FAA conduct that are con-
sidered discretionary within the meaning of the exception,
and conversely, FAA conduct that is not protected by the
exception. Medley consolidated three actions that arose
out of two airplane crashes. Plaintiffs asserted that both
crashes occurred while the pilots were following a route
marked out on a sectional aeronautical chart published by
the FAA. The FAA placed the route on the chart in re-
sponse to a private citizen's suggestion that a particularly
dangerous California canyon be noted on the sectional
chart. The Acting Director of the Air Traffic Control Divi-
sion of the Western Regional Office of the FAA recom-
mended that two routes be placed on the next San
Francisco sectional chart. Unfortunately, only one of the
routes was actually placed on the 19th edition of the
chart, along with a misleading elevation figure. Once the
FAA discovered the mistake, the route was removed from
'18 Id. The court gave examples of conduct at the operations level that have not
been considered discretionary within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). These
included the decision to make low level plane flights to make a survey (citing
Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956)), and the operation of an
air traffic control tower (citing Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co, 221 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir 1955)). Id.
149 Swanson, 229 F. Supp. at 221. The court stated that this case was similar to
United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962), where the plaintiff al-
leged that his land was damaged by the government's failure to provide proper
drainage from an Air Force Base. Swanson, 229 F. Supp. at 221. The Ninth Circuit
noted that in Hunsucker, the discretionary function exception did not bar plaintiff's
claim because the plaintiff was complaining about inadequate drainage, rather
than the decision to reactivate the base, which was policy related. Id.
I Id.
151 543 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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the 20th edition, but somehow reappeared on the 21st
edition chart. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of fol-
lowing the chart, the two pilots became trapped in a
"blind canyon" and consequently crashed into the canyon
wall. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the FAA negli-
gently prepared the chart and failed to adequately instruct
on the chart's proper use.
The court determined that the plaintiffs based their
claims on six distinct categories of government con-
duct. 5 2 The court applied the Dalehite planning-level/op-
erations-level distinction in conjunction with the
"prevailing test" developed by the Ninth Circuit in Lin-
dgren v. United States. 5 3 Based on the planning-level/oper-
ations-level distinction, the court held that the
discretionary function exception protected the FAA offi-
cial's decision to add a route to the sectional chart. 54 The
court concluded that such a decision was infrequent, not
day-to-day, and was based on public safety and policy con-
152 Id. at 1216. The six categories are as follows:
(1) The decision to chart routes over the Kearsarge Pass area to be
published on the San Francisco sectional chart.
(2) The failure to warn of the Center Basin hazard.
(3) The choice of where to chart route over the Kearsarge Pass area.
(4) How the route was placed in the sectional chart.
(5) The failure of FAA officials to review the chart to be sure that
the proposed routes had been accurately depicted.
(6) Failure to warn pilots of the danger of the route, and failure to
promptly remove the route from the chart, after publication of the
chart and discovery of the hazards of the route.
Id.
153 665 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1982). The prevailing test distinguishes between acts
or omissions occurring at the planning level and those occurring at the opera-
tional level:
Not every discretionary act is exempt. Obviously, attending to many
day-to-day details of management involves decisions and thus some
element of discretion. The exercise of this kind of discretion does
not fall within the discretionary function exemption. The distinction
generally made in the application of the discretionary function ex-
emption is between those decisions which are made on a policy or
planning level, as opposed to those made on an operational level.
Id. at 980.
1.14 Medley, 543 F.2d at 1218.
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siderations. 55  The court rationalized that holding
"otherwise could impair the effective administration of
the FAA as there could be a chilling effect on FAA officials
who should be free to make decisions affecting the safety
of the public without fear or threat of lawsuits and per-
sonal liability."' 156 With regard to the status of the deci-
sion-maker, however, the court recognized that had the
Acting Director acted outside the scope of his authority,
the exemption would not apply, "because there can be no
discretion to engage in unauthorized activities."'' 57
The second category of allegedly negligent government
conduct was the government's failure to warn pilots of the
nearby canyon and failure to inform pilots that safer
routes existed.'-" The court recognized that a decision
whether to inform pilots of the presence of a natural dan-
ger is usually considered a discretionary function, but the
court determined that this situation was unique because
the government's conduct actually created a hazardous
situation.'5 9 The court held that the decision not to warn
of a danger created by the government was an opera-
tional-level decision, and therefore, was not protected by
the discretionary function exemption.' 60
The court held that the third category of conduct,
choosing which route to place on the chart and also the
15 Id. The court recognized that the decision may not have been an exercise of
good judgment, but was nonetheless a policy-related decision. Id. at 1219.
156 Id. The court further reasoned that permitting review of this type of deci-
sion "would cause the decision-maker to refrain from making such decisions for
fear of personal liability, and this result would be more deleterious to the public
safety than the individual negligence sought to be reviewed." Id.
I57 d. (citing Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978)).
158 Medley, 543 F. Supp. at 1220.
159 Id.
-io Id. at 1221. The court further noted that placing such a warning on the
sectional chart would not be administratively burdensome, which was a factor the
Ninth Circuit weighed in determining whether conduct was protected by the ex-
emption. Id. at 1218, 1221. The sixth category of conduct, which included the
government's failure to promptly remove the dangerous route from the chart, was
also held to be operational-level conduct for the same reasons that the failure to
warn of the canyon was found non-discretionary. Id. at 1223-24.
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alleged negligent preparation of the chart,' 6' was also
non-discretionary conduct within the meaning of the ex-
emption. 62 The court held that these activities were
clearly operational-level decisions, rationalizing its deci-
sion based on the "good samaritan" rule set forth in In-
dian Towing. 163 The government had no duty to assist
pilots through this dangerous area, but once it undertook
this duty and induced reliance, the government had a duty
to proceed with due care.' 14 "When this duty of care is
discharged in a negligent manner, the government is
guilty of negligence and it cannot escape liability by in-
voking the discretionary function exception, for there is
no discretion to conduct discretionary operations
negligently."' 165
The 1985 case of Heller v. United States166 is helpful in
determining government liability for negligent pilot certi-
fication. The FAA issued a transport pilot certificate to
plaintiff Heller, a commercial airline pilot. Heller had a
first-class medical certificate in connection with his pilot
certificate. Pursuant to federal regulations, Heller's doc-
tor notified the FAA that Heller had developed an unu-
sual medical problem. 167  Upon receiving this
information, the FAA medical examiner withdrew the
plaintiff's medical certificate, and denied his recertifica-
tion. This withdrawal meant that Heller could no longer
work as a commercial airline pilot. After reapplication
and petitioning for an exemption, the FAA reissued Hel-
l,, Plaintiffs claimed that the chart was inaccurate because of the omission of
the safer northerly route and the misleading elevation figure. Id. at 1222.
162 Id.
11- Id. (citing Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64-65).
164 Medley, 543 F. Supp. at 1222 (citations omitted).
11- Id. With regard to the fifth category of conduct, the FAA's alleged failure to
review the inaccurate chart, the court held that if such a duty to review existed
then the discharge of that duty was an operational-level function, and thus, non-
discretionary within the meaning of the exemption. Id. at 1223.
1- 620 F. Supp. 270 (M.D. Fla. 1985), af'd, 803 F.2d 1558 (11 th Cir. 1986).
M7 Heller's physician conducted several tests on Heller, including an electrocar-
diogram (EKG), and on the basis of those tests, diagnosed Heller as having a
myocardial infarction.
[59
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ler's certificate. 168
Heller sued the government, alleging that the FAA neg-
ligently denied his medical certificate.' 69 He claimed that
his medical certificate was suspended due to "careless and
negligent investigation, data collection, data production,
and diagnostic procedures and activities of agents and
employees of the FAA."' 70  The trial court, relying on
Varig, stated that the entire commercial aircraft certifica-
tion procedure was discretionary within the meaning of
the discretionary function exception. 17' The trial court
dismissed the complaint, stating:
The FAA's implementation of a mechanism for medical
certification, as well as aircraft certification, issuance, re-
-"' On January 30, 1980, the FAA accepted a letter from Dr. Richard L. Masters
as a petition on behalf of Heller requesting an exemption from Part 67 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations. In order to be eligible for a first class medical cer-
tificate, the applicant must have no established medical history or clinical diagno-
sis of myocardial infarction. Id. at 1562 (citing Federal Aviation Administration,
14 C.F.R. § 67.13(e)(1)(i) (1993)).
The Federal Air Surgeon has the discretion to issue a special medical certificate
to
an applicant who does not meet the applicable provisions of § 67.13
[first-class medical certificate], § 67.15 [second-class medical certifi-
cate], or § 67.17 [third-class medical certificate] if the applicant
shows to the satisfaction of the Federal Air Surgeon that the duties
authorized by the class of medical certificate applied for can be per-
formed without endangering air commerce during the period in
which the certificate would be in force.
14 C.F.R. § 67.19(a).
169 Heler, 620 F. Supp. at 271.
170 Id.
171 Id. The trial court then quoted part of the Supreme Court's decision in
Varig:
as in Dalehite it is unnecessary-and indeed impossible-to define
with precision every contour of the discretionary function exception
... first, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
act, that governs whether the discretionary function exception ap-
plies in a given case ... thus, the basic inquiry concerning the appli-
cation of the discretionary function exception is whether the
challenged acts of a government employee-whatever his or her
rank-are of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield
from liability . . .second, whatever else the discretionary function
may include, it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary
acts of the government acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct
of private individuals.
Id. (quoting United States v. Varig, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) (citations omitted)).
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view, and reissuance, is plainly a discretionary activity of
the nature and quality protected by § 2680(a). Medical li-
censing authority of the FAA is clearly a role where the
government is acting in its role "as a regulator of the con-
duct of private individuals." 72
To hold the entire FAA medical certification process
outside the scope of the exception would handicap effi-
cient government operations. Furthermore, such a deci-
sion concerning medical determinations by the surgeon
would place the determinations in constant jeopardy of
potential tort suits. The safer, and ultimately better, pol-
icy is to err in favor of grounding a pilot of suspect qualifi-
cation, thereby fulfilling the overriding responsibility to
the public. Finally, the individual acts and decisions in is-
suing and suspending, or reissuing, a medical or commer-
cial pilot certificate are discretionary acts of a policy and
decision-making nature within the scope of section
2680(a). 173
On appeal, Heller argued that the government's negli-
gent failure to consult his 1968 EKG174 was not a discre-
tionary activity and that the denial of his medical
certificate was a result of the negligent application of 14
C.F.R. section 67.13(e)(1)(i), which did not require the
FAA to balance policy concerns. 75 The Eleventh Circuit
applied the guidelines set forth in Varig"7 6 and another
Eleventh Circuit case, Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
172 Id. at 271-72 (citations omitted).
173 Id.
174 The court accepted as true Heller's allegations that there was no material
difference in the 1968 EKG that the government had on file and the EKG on
which disqualification was based, and that the government failed to make the com-
parison, resulting in negligent disqualification. Heler, 803 F.2d at 1562.
175 Id.
176 Varig requires consideration of the following issues: 1) whether the act was
of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from liability, and 2)
whether the government, by these discretionary acts, is acting as a regulator of the
conduct of private individuals. Id. at 1563 (citing Varig, 467 U.S. at 813). The
court held: "When an agency determines the extent to which it will supervise the
safety procedures of private individuals, it is exercising discretionary regulatory
authority of the most basic kind." Id. (quoting Varig, at 815).
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United States,1 7 7 in rejecting Heller's contentions on ap-
peal. 78 The court concluded that the FAA medical certifi-
cation process involved in this case necessarily implicated
policy considerations relating to air safety as well as medi-
cal judgment, and therefore fell within the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA."79 More specifically, the
court, relying on Payton v. United States,' a0 rejected Heller's
first contention - that the negligent failure to consider
the 1968 EKG was not protected by the discretionary
function exception. The court held that the FAA's failure
to consider Heller's 1968 EKG also fell within the scope
of the exception. '8 '
Heller's second contention, that the FAA negligently
applied section 67.13(e)(1)(i), was also ultimately rejected
by the court.'8 2 Plaintiff relied on dictum found in the
D.C. Circuit case Beins v. United States,'8 3 which stated that
the medical standard under section 67.13(e)(1)(i) fell
within a category of determinations not protected by the
discretionary function exception.8 4 Beins also involved an
177 769 F.2d 1523 (11 th Cir. 1985). Alabama Electric stated that the key inquiry
in determining whether the discretionary function exception applied is "whether
or not the professional discretion involves policy considerations." Id. at 1529 n.2.
178 Heller, 803 F.2d at 1564.
179 Id. at 1565-66.
i8 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982). In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that a pa-
role board's negligent failure to "acquire, read, or give adequate consideration"
to certain records that would show that the parolee was a danger to society fell
within the discretionary function exception. Id. at 482. The court reasoned that
the decision not to consider the records ultimately implicated its discretionary
function. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit in Heller quoted the Fifth Circuit:
In fulfilling this task, the Board must exercise its judgment by deter-
mining the materiality of certain studies and documents and the pro-
priety of relying thereon in reaching its final assessment. Further,
the manner and degree of consideration with which the Board exam-
ines these materials is inextricably tied to its ultimate decision.
Heller, 803 F.2d at 1564 (quoting Payton, 679 F.2d at 482).
1, Heller, 803 F.2d at 1564.
182 Id. Plaintiff contended that his certificate was denied due to a negligent find-
ing that he had an "established medical history or clinical diagnosis" of myocar-
dial infarction, and that this finding only implicated medical judgment, not policy-
making concerns, and therefore fell outside of the exception. Id.
695 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
18 Id. at 603.
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allegedly negligent application of expert reports and the
FAA's evaluations of the plaintiff regarding the vision and
neurological standards. The Beins court stated that when
applying the discretionary function exception to the medi-
cal certification process, the court must examine the regu-
lations at issue to determine whether they give FAA
officials a range of policy judgment or only require stan-
dard medical judgment. 85 In dictum, the court stated
that section 67.13(e)(1)(i), dealing with myocardial infarc-
tion, "require[s] the FAA to evaluate a medical condition,
not to weigh and balance the effect of the condition on the
pilot's ability to perform his duties safely."' 86
The Heller court expressly rejected the dicta in Beins,
concluding:
[I]n the context of medical examinations conducted by the
FAA to determine whether persons shall be certificated to
pilot in air commerce, the determination of whether an ap-
plicant has an "established medical history or clinical diag-
nosis" of myocardial infarction involves not only a medical
judgment but also necessarily implicates policy
concerns. '
87
The court reasoned that the emphasis of the statute at is-
sue was safety, that the regulation was "intended to pro-
vide guidance for medical experts in their determination
of whether the airman is suffering from a disorder that
prevents him from performing his duties safely," not ben-
efit the airmen. 88 The court held that a determination of
185 Id. at 602.
186 Id. at 603.
187 Heler, 803 F.2d at 1565.
188 Id. at 1566. The court quoted the history of § 67.13(e)(1)(i) to illustrate the
regulation's emphasis on safety:
The [Flight Safety] Foundation recommends, in effect, that [the]
existence of [a history of myocardial infarction] is an appropriate ba-
sis for disqualification for any class of medical certificate. This rec-
ommendation is based on the medical fact that [this condition]
can[not] be as precisely studied in the individual as to provide assur-
ance that they will not interfere with the safe piloting of aircraft. In
reality, the likelihood of occurrence of partially or totally incapacitat-
ing states directly attributable to these conditions is so great, and the
ability to provide acceptable medical assurance of nonoccurrence of
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whether a history of myocardial infarction would affect air
safety involved more than medical judgment and is "influ-
enced by the fact that the ultimate decision is whether this
particular applicant should be permitted to fly.",' 9 The
court noted that in applying this medical standard, the
FAA would be conservative in its decision-making in or-
der to avoid real safety risks.' 90 The court therefore held
that the application of section 67.13(e)(1)(i) necessarily
implicates policy concerns protected by the discretionary
function exception.' 9 '
The discretionary function exception also barred the
claim in the post-Berkovitz case of Pepper v. United States. '92
The suit in Pepper arose out of a fatal airplane crash that
occurred when a plane lost power during takeoff and
struck trees at the end of the runway. Plaintiffs sued
under the FTCA claiming that the trees obstructed air
navigation within the meaning of 14 C.F.R. Part 77, and
that the FAA negligently failed to eliminate the
obstruction. 93
The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the discretionary function ex-
ception barred the claim. 94 The court's dismissal rested
on the assumption that the FAA never undertook to rem-
edy the "obstruction."'' 95 The court cited Berkovitz for the
proposition that "the FTCA's 'discretionary function' ex-
such states in any given individual is so inadequate, that these condi-
tions existing in.airmen constitute a definite hazard to safety in
flight.
Id. (quoting 24 Fed. Reg. 7307, 7309 (1959)).
1I9 Id.
190 Id.
'91 Id. The court recognized that a number of the FAA medical standards ex-
pressly require the FAA to balance safety objectives. Helter, 803 F.2d at 1566; see
14 C.F.R. §§ 67.13(d)(1)(ii), .13(d)(2)(ii), .13(f)(2); 67.15(d)(1)(ii), .15(d)(2)(ii),
.15(f)(2); 67.17(d)(1)(ii), .17(d)(2)(ii), .17(0(2) (1993). But the court also noted
that some regulations, such as § 67.13(e)(1)(i), do not expressly incorporate
safety objectives. Heller, 503 F.2d at 1566. Nevertheless, the court held that this
regulation implicated policy concerns, and was therefore protected. Id.
1112 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,775 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
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ception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), destroys jurisdiction to hear
claims based upon a regulatory agency's failure to take ac-
tion desired by a member of the public, where such action
is not explicitly required by statute or regulation."' 96 The
court held that because the FAA had discretion to deal
with the situation, and chose not to take remedial steps,
the court could not hear the claim. 97 The court men-
tioned, however, that if the FAA had made an effort to
remedy the obstruction, the discretionary function excep-
tion would not apply. 98
Another important case on the issue of government lia-
bility for negligent certification is Leone v. United States,'99
in which a district court took a notably different stance
than that taken by the Eleventh Circuit in Heller two years
earlier.200 In Leone plaintiff's decedents died in an air-
plane crash when the pilot of the plane apparently suf-
fered a heart attack. The regulation involved, 14 C.F.R.
§ 67.17(e)(1), was essentially the same regulation at issue
in Heller,20 1 and provided that in order for a third-class
medical certificate to be issued, the applicant must be free
of cardiovascular problems.20 2 The plaintiffs sued the fed-
eral government alleging that aviation medical examiners
negligently examined the pilot for evidence of heart dis-
196 Id. The court noted that statutes and regulations pertaining to navigable
airspace do not require the FAA to remove obstructions. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1348(a) (1988); 14 C.F.R. pt. 77 (1993); Reminga v. United States, 631
F.2d 449, 456-57 (6th Cir. 1980)). "Their language [the statutes' and regulations'
language] connotes discretion rather than mandatory requirements, general pol-
icy standards rather than specific directions." Id.
191 Pepper, 21 Av. Cas. at 17,776.
1911 Id. (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 530, 539 n.3 (1988)). "Once
an agency undertakes to execute a made decision, it must act with due care." Id.
111 690 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
2 " A broad reading of Heller could stand for the proposition that the FAA medi-
cal certification process is discretionary.
20, The regulation at issue in Heller was 14 C.F.R. § 67.13(e)(1) (1993), which
uses the exact same language as § 67.17(e)(1), but applies to first-class medical
certificates, rather than third-class medical certificates. See Heller, 803 F.2d at
1558.
202 Leone, 690 F. Supp. at 1183. Section 67.17(e) specifically provides that an
applicant must have:
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ease prior to issuing the pilot his FAA certification. °
More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the FAA physi-
cians failed to adequately inquire into the pilot's medical
history and failed to sufficiently examine him for evidence
of heart problems.20 4
The court looked to the principles established in Varig,
but refused to read the decision so expansively as to ex-
tend the discretionary function exception to all activities
undertaken pursuant to regulatory authority. 205 The
court noted that the Supreme Court did not hold in Varig
that all regulatory activities are discretionary, stating:
"the law remains that regulatory decisions... that do not
involve policy judgments are not protected by the discre-
tionary function exception. ' 2 6  More specifically, the
court noted that where granting a license would require
"balancing of several factors and the grant or refusal to
grant is made without reliance upon any readily ascertain-
able rule or standard, the courts will hold the judgment to
be discretionary. 2 0 7 Conversely, "where the grant in-
volves nothing more than the matching of facts against a
clear rule or standard, the grant will be considered opera-
tional and not discretionary. "208
"(1) No established medical history or clinical diagnosis of-
(i) Myocardial infarction;
(ii) Angina pectoris; or
(iii) Coronary heart disease that has required treatment or, if untreated, that
has been symptomatic or clinically significant." 14 C.F.R. § 67.17(e) (1993).
203 Leone, 690 F. Supp. at 1183.
Id. Specifically, plaintiffs claim the physicians were negligent in their exami-
nations in:
(1) failing to question or inadequately questioning Mr. Small about
his medical history; (2) failing to or inadequately performing a steth-
oscopic examination of Mr. Small's heart; (3) failing to or inade-
quately examining Mr. Small's skin by failing to see a catheterization
scar or obtain information about it; and (4) failing to find the medi-
cal history or clinically significant signs of angina or coronary heart
disease.Id.
I.20 Leone, 690 F. Supp. at 1187 (rejecting the government's argument).
-, Id. at 1188.
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Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the
court determined that the alleged negligence involved
was a "failure to apply clearly articulated medical stan-
dards in the context of a physical examination, "'29 and
that the Aviation Medical Examiners made no policy deci-
sions.2 0 The discretionary function exception, therefore,
did not serve to protect the United States from liability.2 1
Nor did the discretionary function exception protect
the FAA in the 1990 case of Hayes v. United States,21 2 a par-
ticularly relevant case involving a suit against the FAA
arising out of the pilot certification process. In Hayes
Nancy Yates sought certification as a Learjet command pi-
lot. She asked her friend, FAA aviation safety inspector
Marcus Belcher, to administer the test. After taking the
written part of the test, Nancy proceeded to take the ac-
tual "flight" test. Because FAA inspector Belcher lacked
sufficient recent experience in the Learjet Model 35 to act
as co-pilot or safety pilot, Jack Hayes, an experienced pi-
lot, occupied the right front seat as safety pilot. This
21'1 Id. at 1188.
210 Id.
211 Id. In another post-Berkovitz aviation case, Fleming v. United States, 21 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 18,335 (W.D. Pa. 1989), a pilot and co-pilot sought damages for
injuries sustained when their aircraft crashed while attempting to land with the aid
of a government-operated navigational aid termed a Non-Directional Beacon
(NDB). The NDB was alleged to have been improperly placed for use as a sepa-
rate navigational device. Plaintiffs contended that their use of the NDB was neces-
sary because the airport's Instrument Landing System (ILS) facility was not
working at the time of the crash, The government argued that its previous acqui-
sition of the existing NDB as a federal navigational facility was a discretionary act
protected by the discretionary function exception.
Relying on Berkovitz, the court concluded that governmental conduct that in-
duced reliance did not, in and of itself, create an actionable claim under the
FTCA. Id. at 18,338. Rather, the claimant was required to show that the chal-
lenged conduct did not involve an element of judgment or choice, or that the
judgment or choice did not concern an area intended to be protected from liabil-
ity. Id. The court determined that the government's conduct arguably involved
settled policy matters. Id. The court held that the discretionary function did not
apply if the FAA was required to operate the NDB when the airport's ILS was out
of service. Id. at 18,339. Since it was unknown whether the government was re-
quired to operate the NDB at the time of the crash, the court denied the govern-
ment's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the discretionary function
exception. Id.
2 899 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1990).
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placed inspector Belcher in the "potty" seat located im-
mediately behind the cockpit in the passenger
compartment.
To pass the test, Yates had to demonstrate competence
at several maneuvers, including a "VI cut."' 2 13 FAA regu-
lations require inspectors to administer pre-flight brief-
ings to coordinate responsibilities among crew
members.21 4 Inspector Belcher, however, did not conduct
such a briefing, believing it was unnecessary given the
flight experience of both Yates and Hayes. Yates at-
tempted a V I cut, but did not perform the maneuver satis-
factorily. 5 Apparently, Belcher thought this first V1 cut
fell in a "gray area," one performed neither satisfactorily
nor unsatisfactorily. Belcher therefore had Yates attempt
the maneuver again. The second attempt resulted in a
crash that destroyed the plane, killing Yates and injuring
Belcher and Hayes.
The Learjet company, Hayes and Hayes's wife sued the
government, alleging that FAA inspector Belcher negli-
gently failed to conduct the required pre-flight briefing,
and negligently gave an impermissible second chance at
213 Hayes, 899 F.2d at 442; see 14 C.F.R. pt. 61 app. A (1986).
A "VI cut" in a twin-engine Learjet requires the applicant to
demonstrate a takeoff with a simulated one-engine failure at a speed
in excess of"Vl" that in the judgment of the examiner is appropri-
ate to the airplane type under the prevailing conditions. VI is the
velocity at which, once exceeded, the plane must take off. Below
that speed, the takeoff can be aborted.
Hayes, 899 F.2d at 442.
214 Hayes, 899 F.2d at 442 (citing Southwest Supplement to F.A.A. Order,
8710.4).
215 Id.
When VI was achieved, Hayes reduced power on the right engine to
idle speed. The airplane then "yawed" (slowly turned) to the left,
although yawing to the right was to be expected. The airplane con-
tinued out of alignment off the runway and became airborne. Imme-
diately thereafter, Belcher, who could see the yoke in Yates' hands
but could not see Hayes, saw a sharp jerky movement of the yoke to
the right. This movement apparently was an intervention by Hayes.
During the flight test, the safety pilot is not to hold the yoke, but is
to stand by prepared to intervene in case of impending danger. Af-
ter this attempt at a VI cut, Yates managed to land the plane safely.
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the VI cut. The government argued that Belcher's deci-
sion to let Yates have a second chance at the V1 cut was
an exercise of the FAA's discretionary function. The gov-
ernment specifically relied on Berkovitz, urging that
Belcher's decision to let Yates have a second attempt at
the VI maneuver met the two prong test established in
Berkovitz.
The court squarely rejected the government's argu-
ment, holding that while Belcher's decisions may have re-
quired the exercise of discretion within the meaning of
the first prong, his decisions were not of the type Con-
gress intended to protect. 21 6 The court determined that
"Belcher's actions were merely part of his day-to-day 'op-
erational function' and not policy-related at all," and
therefore, the discretionary function exception did not
apply.2 17
Finally, the most recent relevant case is the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Foster v. United States.2 18 Much like Leone
and Heller, this case questioned the permissible discretion
of FAA medical examiners. In Foster an FAA flight sur-
geon denied commercial pilot Joseph O'Brien a Class II
medical certificate. Eventually, however, the FAA issued
O'Brien a special Class II certificate under FAA regula-
tions, valid for one year and contingent on positive results
of regular physical and cardiovascular examinations. This
special certificate required O'Brien to cease flying if he
experienced any adverse medical changes. O'Brien suf-
fered a heart attack but did not report it to the FAA and
continued flying. O'Brien and Foster's decedent were
killed when the helicopter O'Brien was piloting crashed.
Foster sued the United States and FAA surgeon Frank
Austin, alleging that Austin negligently issued a special
Class II certificate to O'Brien.2 ' 9 The Ninth Circuit noted
that Austin's actions "were clearly discretionary conduct
216 Id.
217 Id.
2111 923 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991).
219) Id. at 766-67.
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which may be protected by the discretionary function ex-
ception,1 22 0 but that "the discretionary function excep-
tion would be inapplicable if Austin's discretion to grant
special issue Class II certificates was not the type of deci-
sion intended to be shielded from tort liability." 22 1 The
court accepted the Eleventh Circuit's rationale in Heller,
holding that "Austin's decision to issue a special issuance
Class II medical certificate to O'Brien is an inherently pol-
icy-oriented decision that requires consideration of social
and economic policies. '"222 The discretionary function ex-
ception served to bar this action against the
government.2
V. PREDICTION AND HYPOTHETICAL
SITUATIONS REGARDING SUITS AGAINST THE
FAA FOR NEGLIGENT CERTIFICATION
As the previous case discussions show, the FAA may be
held liable for licensing a pilot who later turns out to be
unfit. Predicting when the discretionary function excep-
tion shields the FAA from tort liability, however, is not
easy. The cases discussed below certainly provide guide-
lines for determining the scope of the exemption, but
nevertheless, those guidelines, when applied by various
courts, result in differing opinions.
One may safely assume that any non-discretionary deci-
sion or any discretionary decision that does not require
the balancing of policy objectives could be the subject of a
tort suit against the United States, i.e., that the discretion-
ary function exception will not shield the decisions from
liability. Beyond that broad prediction, however, diffi-
culty arises in predicting the scope of the discretionary
function exception with regard to suits for negligent certi-
fication. For example, the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits
would likely hold any claim involving the medical certifica-
2', Id. at 768.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 769.
223 Id.
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tion process immune from liability.22 4 The Eastern Dis-
trict of New York, however, would only immunize such a
decision if the medical standard involved requires the bal-
ancing of policy objectives, rather than mere medical dis-
cretion. 2 5  The Fifth Circuit would likely apply the
Dalehite "planning-level/operations-level" distinction,
which would only protect a decision involving the medical
certification process if the decision is made at a "planning
level. 12 26 Under this theory, decisions made at the day-to-
day "operations level" are not considered discretionary
within the meaning of the discretionary function excep-
tion. The use of this distinction in determining the scope
of the exemption would necessarily subject the govern-
ment to liability more often than not, because any negli-
gence on the part of air surgeons and flight instructors/
inspectors would likely occur at an "operations-level"
rather than at a "planning-level."
The regulations relevant to this discussion are 14
C.F.R. Parts 61 and 67. Part 61 contains regulations for
the certification of pilots and flight instructors. Part 67
contains regulations for medical certification.
A. MEDICAL CERTIFICATION
From the prior case discussion, it appears that a Part 67
regulation that simply lists medical standards to be met by
an applicant does not require a Federal Air Surgeon to
balance policy objectives. A decision made with regard to
Part 67, therefore, would likely not be protected by the
discretionary function exception. 27 For example, section
67.17(b) states that in order to be eligible for a third-class
medical certificate, an applicant must have: "(1) Distant
224 See supra note 166-91 and corresponding text discussing Heller v. United
States; see also supra note 221-26 and corresponding text discussing Foster v.
United States.
225 See supra note 199-211 and corresponding text discussing Leone v. United
States.
226 See supra note 212-20 and corresponding text discussing Hayes v. United
States.
227 Id.; see supra note 199-211 and corresponding text discussing Leone v.
United States.
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visual acuity of 20/50 or better in each eye separately,
without correction, or... [standards for corrected vision].
(2) No serious pathology of the eye. (3) Ability to distin-
guish aviation signal red, aviation signal green, and
white. ' 22 8 While Section 67.17 arguably requires the ex-
ercise of some medical discretion, it probably does not re-
quire a surgeon to balance policy objectives.
Furthermore, courts would probably consider the sur-
geon's duty under this section "operations-level" conduct
as opposed to "planning-level" conduct within the mean-
ing of the Dalehite distinction. Therefore, courts will likely
not consider a decision made regarding this particular
section discretionary within the meaning of the
exception. 29
Turning to Sections 67.13(e)(i) and 67 .17(e)(1), 230
which are the provisions at issue in Heller and Leone and
which focus on the cardiovascular system of an applicant,
these provisions, like section 67.17(b), arguably establish
direct mandate and leave no room for policy-related dis-
cretion. The Eastern District of New York, in fact, made
such a determination. 23' But as discussed, the Eleventh
Circuit in Heller held that a decision concerning section
67.17(b), and apparently all other decisions regarding the
medical certification process, is discretionary within the
meaning of the exemption. 2
Other regulations contained in Part 67 seem inherently
discretionary. For example, section 67.19(a) provides:
At the discretion of the Federal Air Surgeon, a medical
certificate may be issued to an applicant who does not
meet the applicable provisions of §§ 67.13 [First-class
medical certificate], 67.15 [Second-class medical certifi-
2" 14 C.F.R. § 67.17(b) (1993).
229 At this point it is necessary to point out that this prediction may be inaccu-
rate, due to the fact that some courts, like the Eleventh Circuit in Heller, may
choose to hold the entire medical certification process discretionary within the
meaning of the exemption. See supra note 187-91.
2." See supra notes 168, 201 and corresponding text.
21 See supra note 191 and corresponding text.
2.12 See supra note 194 and corresponding text.
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cate], or 67.17 [Third-class medical certificate] if the appli-
cant shows to the satisfaction of the Federal Air Surgeon
that the duties authorized by the class of medical certifi-
cate applied for can be performed without endangering air
commerce during the period in which the certificate would
be in force.233
This section clearly allows the Federal Air Surgeon "dis-
cretion" to bend the rules and grant an applicant a medi-
cal certificate when the applicant does not meet the
required standards. Application of this provision argua-
bly requires surgeons to balance policy objectives, espe-
cially public safety, when determining whether to grant
the certificate. More specifically, the surgeon must be
convinced that granting the certificate does not "endan-
ger[] air commerce."
Section 67.19(b) enumerates the factors that the Fed-
eral Air Surgeon "may" consider in making this determi-
nation,23 4 and section 67.19(d) allows the surgeon
discretion to limit or condition the effect of the special
medical certificate. 35 Neither provision states a direct
mandate that the surgeon must follow. Instead, the use of
the word "may" in both provisions illustrates the intent of
Congress to leave the issuance of special medical certifi-
cates to the complete discretion of the surgeon.23 6 A deci-
sion made in conjunction with this section, therefore, will
likely be protected by the exemption.3 7 A specific provi-
sion of section 67.19 does, however, appear to issue a di-
rect mandate by abrogating a surgeon's discretion in
choosing whether or not to follow the provision. Section
67.19(c) provides:
In determining whether the special issuance of a third-
2-1. 14 C.F.R. § 67.19(a) (1993).
234 Id. § 67.19(b).
, _45Id. § 67.19(d).
216 "The Federal Air Surgeon may consider the applicant's operational experi-
ence .... " 14 C.F.R. § 67.19(b) (1993). "In issuing a medical certificate under
this section, the Federal Air Surgeon may do any or all of the following: .... 14
C.F.R. § 67.19(d) (1993).
2-17 See Foster, supra note 221 and corresponding text.
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class medical certificate should be made to an applicant,
the Federal Air Surgeon considers the freedom of an air-
man, exercising the privileges of a private pilot certificate,
to accept reasonable risks to his or her person and prop-
erty that are not acceptable in the exercise of commercial
or airline transport privileges, and, at the same time, con-
siders the need to protect the public safety of persons and
property in other aircraft and on the ground.23 8
This provision states that the surgeon "considers," not
"may consider." Subsection (c) appears to be a direct
mandate that the surgeon must consider these factors.
Therefore, the discretionary function exception arguably
should not shield a decision by the surgeon to disregard
such factors. In "considering" the required factors, how-
ever, the surgeon must exercise discretion, balancing the
policy concern of public safety. The discretionary func-
tion exception, therefore, arguably protects any decision
reached as a result of balancing these factors. Also, as
pointed out in Heller, whenever a medical decision is made
to ground a pilot, courts will likely view the grounding as
a necessary precaution for public safety.
B. PILOT CERTIFICATION
The same argument used in the discussion of medical
certification is useful in predicting what acts during pilot
certification are protected by the discretionary function
exception. For example, a regulation requiring an appli-
cant to successfully perform a "VI-cut" maneuver 23 9 ap-
pears to be a mandatory standard. Application of this
standard does not require policy-related decision-making.
A flight instructor conducting a flight test, however, must
use discretion in administering the test, as that instructor
is responsible for both the safety of the plane's occupants
and, to some extent, anyone or anything that might be in
the plane's way. For example, if an applicant fails to per-
form a maneuver satisfactorily on the first try, the inspec-
238 14 C.F.R. § 67.19(c) (1993) (emphasis added).
2'31 Id. § 61 app. A (1993).
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tor must exercise a certain amount of discretion in
deciding whether to allow the applicant a second chance.
The exercise of such discretion necessarily implicates pol-
icy concerns, such as public safety. But as discussed, the
Fifth Circuit in Hayes v. United States24 ° reasoned differ-
ently.24 ' The Fifth Circuit held that even if the decision to
allow a second attempt involved the exercise of discretion,
the inspector's actions were part of his day-to-day "opera-
tional" functions and were not policy related.2 42 Another
court, however, might well have considered this decision
discretionary within the meaning of the exception.
As shown in the preceding discussion, the existing case
law provides guidelines for determining the scope of the
discretionary function exception. Unfortunately, those
guidelines do not clearly define the exception's bounda-
ries. Therefore, a unified standard is needed.
VI. PROPER APPLICATION OF THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
Some commentators argue that the discretionary func-
tion exception is currently construed too broadly, acting
as a "shield for serious acts of government negli-
gence. ' 243 A broad application of the exception does not
place incentives on the government to act with due
care. 244 Others argue that the discretionary function ex-
ception should be construed more narrowly and should
extend only to conduct that is clearly intended by Con-
gress to be shielded from immunity.245 One proposition
suggests that the shield should only protect "decisions to
initiate or not to initiate particular programs, projects,
240 899 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1990).
241 See supra note 219-20 and corresponding text.
242 Id.
241 Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 2, at 360. Schwartz and Mahshigian
would have Congress clarify the exception to "make clear that the government
has no 'discretion' to negligently expose its workers or others to harmful chemi-
cals and substances." Id.
244 Id. at 370.
245 See Blakeley supra note 1, at 174.
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laws or regulations. 246
The exception should not be construed more broadly
or more narrowly, but rather, it should be construed dif-
ferently. First, the Dalehite "planning-level/operations-
level" distinction should be completely discarded. This
distinction has created a "murky bog on which sure-foot-
ing is impossible. ' 247 Moreover, the distinction is irra-
tional and arbitrarily throws out operations-level
decisions, which, as illustrated by Hayes, may involve pol-
icy-related decisions. Some government employees are
required to balance social, economic, political, and safety
concerns on a daily basis, even at the operations level.
These decisions should be protected by the discretionary
function exception. Any authorized decision that requires
a government employee to weigh policy objectives should
be protected, regardless of the level at which it was made.
Furthermore, a new standard is needed to lend predict-
ability to an area of law that has become increasingly con-
fusing and has resulted in numerous differing opinions in
the federal courts.2 48 The new standard should also offer
protection for activities that are uniquely governmental in
nature.249
In 1987, such an approach was constructed with regard
to the discretionary function exception to the Iowa Tort
Claims Act, an act which closely parallels the Federal Tort
Claims Act and has apparently caused just as much confu-sion.250 Kenneth Purcell's "Exhaustion of Discretion"
test would focus on whether the conduct involved re-
quired the exercise of discretion, i.e., policy-related deci-
sions. 25 ' The "Exhaustion of Discretion" test has two
steps:
The court first would ask whether the legislature intended
246 Id.
247 Id. at 173.
248 Kenneth P. Purcell, A Unified Standard for Construing the Discretionary Function
Exception of the Iowa Tort Claims Act, 73 IOWA L. REV. 183, 198 (1987).
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to exhaust the discretion necessary to realize its stated
policy purpose, with its passage of the authorizing statute.
If the answer to this question is yes, any subsequent action
by a state actor to implement the policy would be opera-
tional in nature and not protected by the discretionary
function exception. If the answer to this first question is
no, the court would go on to ask whether the implementa-
tion of the legislative policy decision required a subse-
quent state actor to choose between two or more possible
courses of action, and whether that choice involved the
weighing of social, economic, and political factors that
made it a uniquely governmental decision. If the answers
to both the questions in this second inquiry are yes, the
state action is planning in nature, and, thus, protected by
the discretionary function exception. If the answer to
either of these questions is no, the state action is opera-
tional in nature and not protected by the exception.252
The only difficulty with the articulation of this test is its
use of the terms "operational in nature" and "planning in
nature." The terms reflect the "murky bog" of the irra-
tional "planning-level/operations-level" distinction which
should be buried forever. Eliminating these terms, Pur-
cell's test adequately protects authorized decision-making
that requires the decision-maker to balance policy objec-
tives, regardless of the level at which these decisions are
made. Furthermore, the exception would not protect de-
cisions that do not require policy-balancing, thereby en-
couraging government employees to use due care when
carrying out their mandated duties.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the prior discussion demonstrates, the FAA can be
subject to liability when it negligently certifies a pilot.
Problems arise when attempting to determine what types
of FAA certification-related decisions the discretionary
function exception protects. As discussed in Part V, a few
of the appellate courts have established trends for deter-
2.12 Id. at 199-200.
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mining the parameters of the exemption, which makes the
results of negligent certification suits more predictable.
Nevertheless, no unified standard exists in the courts of
the United States. The courts instead adhere to a confus-
ing, unworkable, and often irrational set of guidelines for
determining the applicability of the discretionary function
exception.
A new, uniform standard is needed. This standard
should shield all decisions made by authorized govern-
ment employees that require the employees to balance
policy objectives. Conversely, the new, uniform standard
should subject the government to liability both when em-
ployees make decisions outside their designated authority
and when the authorized decision-making does not re-
quire the decision-maker to balance policy objectives.
Such a standard would protect the government when gov-
ernment employees must necessarily exercise discretion
and make policy decisions. Moreover, this standard
would encourage government employees to act with due
care, because the exemption would not immunize all dis-
cretionary governmental activity.
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